Zow
Footballguy
In the theoretical sense, I understand the sentiment that plea bargaining in a bad thing. Heck, I wrote my college thesis on the issue (Albert Alschuler is probably the leading scholar on the issue and wrote some nice articles on the topic) and while I ultimately concluded that plea bargaining is a "necessary evil", there were several compelling reasons why abolishing plea bargaining seemed like a "just" idea. Now, that I'm practicing, I've had plenty of clients get frustrated with the situation where the state has made them an offer that, when compared to the much harsher trial ranges they face is too good to pass up, feel like the state is "forcing" them into taking a plea instead of caring about whether or not they are guilty and giving them their day in court.Congrats and it seems like it's a good thing she doesn't like to deal. In fact given what keeps coming to light about the "justice" system perhaps a few less deals are in order. I wonder if as many innocents would have records if a jury decided instead.Zow said:So a couple years ago this up and coming, gung-ho prosecutor in my jurisdiction got put in charge of the drug prosecution division. Prior to her being there that practice area was smooth: prosecutors were reasonable, plea offers with incentives were made, and some nod towards rehabilitation was considered. However, she changed all that and instituted cross the board policies where all plea offers were essentially "trial offers" and has turned that area of criminal law practice into an essential nightmare. She's also not incredibly nice about it and she'll openly laugh at plea offers and scoff at particular trial defenses. She did so in this case. So we had trial this week.
Jury was out for twenty minutes. Not guilty.
But that said, at least in my experience, in practice plea bargaining is an invaluable tool and does promote justice and fairness. Concerning this particular prosecutor, it's an absolutely terrible thing, at least in my opinion, that she refuses to "deal" (I put that in quotations because she does actually give plea offers, it's just that they often are very probably the same for the same punishment/amount of prison time that a defendant would get in trial so there's no incentive to accept the plea deal). I say this for two reasons, both practical yet greatly distinct from one another.
1. In theory, and as you put it, the tendency is to view cases as people being either guilty or innocent. In reality, most cases are hardly ever that black and white. Generally, the facts of a case are this: person x does some pretty stupid/wrong and the state charges that person with crimes x, y, z. Charge z carries with it some pretty darn harsh consequences and, on its face, seems like a bit of a stretch. Person x certainly isn't "innocent" in the situation, but it's questionable whether the state can actually prove z and it's also questionable whether the consequences charge z carry fit the person's stupid actions. My trial that I referenced above is the perfect example: my client was caught with over one-half ounce of meth on him and made a really dumb statement to the arresting officer that he was just a "drop off" guy. The state charges him with possession but they also then charge him with the additional counts of transporting for sale and possession with the intent to sell (based on the quantity). Why this has a huge practical impact for my client is because mere possession, while still a felony, likely gets him probation whereas the sales charges require a mandatory 5-15 in prison with no chance for good time. That difference is huge. So, in this case, the state's evidence on sales isn't great and my client isn't innocent (heck, at trial I called my client "guilty" and "stupid" in my closing argument -- we had conceded the possession charge) so we are basically gambling 5-10 years in prison on whether a random set of eight people think my client was selling. We were fortunate enough that the jury saw it our way and concluded he wasn't selling, but they certainly could have gone the other way based on the weight and admissions. This gamble is usually avoided by plea bargaining.
2. The practical costs of eliminating plea bargaining are HUGE. While most people understand that death penalty trials are costly, for those same reasons doing regular criminal trials also cost a lot of money. The more trials means more judges, prosecutors, and public defenders are needed. If a defendant goes to trial and loses there is no reason not to appeal so the state will need to pay for appellate attorneys and our appellate courts will be flooded. In my jurisdiction, this prosecutor's new plea policy has costs the small, rural county over 100k in additional expenses on appellate attorney appointments alone. And, of course, county and state administrators don't want to either raise taxes or allocate the appropriate funding, so such a system cannot support itself.
 
	 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
  
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
  
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		 
 
		